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Aboriginal Rights and the  
Honour of the Crown 
Brian Slattery* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the Supreme Court first grasped the nettle of section 35
1
 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982 in the Sparrow case, it held that the constitu-
tional affirmation of Aboriginal rights should be interpreted in the light 
of the fundamental principle of the honour of the Crown. This principle 
pointed simultaneously in two different but complementary directions: 
negotiation and litigation. With respect to the first, the Court noted that 
the section provided a solid constitutional base for negotiated treaties 
between Aboriginal peoples and the Crown that would represent a just 
settlement of their claims. With respect to litigation, the Court held that 
the section furnished Aboriginal rights with a judicial shield against 
legislative infringement and limitation, except where the latter could be 




While the Supreme Court has continued to emphasize the need for 
negotiated settlements of Aboriginal claims, most of its efforts in subse-
quent cases have been directed at delineating the scope of section 35’s 
judicial protection and identifying the legal criteria for recognizing 
Aboriginal rights. Over the past two decades, the Court has made great 
strides in the latter areas. However, until recently it has left largely un-
explored the section’s role as a basis for negotiated settlement. 
This emphasis has tacitly encouraged the view that section 35 em-
bodies a relatively static constitutional order, which mandates courts to 
identify a range of specific Aboriginal rights by applying general legal 
criteria to particular historical circumstances. However, this paradigm 
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needs revision after the Haida Nation
3
 and Taku River
4
 decisions, both 
written by McLachlin C.J. for a unanimous Supreme Court. In these 
cases, the Court portrays the fundamental law governing Aboriginal 
rights as more dynamic than static — mandating a process that involves 
the active participation of indigenous peoples and the Crown in the 
identification of Aboriginal rights. In effect, the Court views section 35 
as a generative constitutional order. Let me explain. 
II. THE STANDARD PARADIGM 
According to the dominant viewpoint, the Crown’s acquisition of 
sovereignty over indigenous peoples and their territories gave rise to 
Aboriginal rights in the common law of Canada. These rights continue 
to exist in their original form unless or until extinguished by legislation, 
voluntary surrender or other valid process. As legal rights, Aboriginal 
rights are cognizable and enforceable in Canadian courts. However, 
Aboriginal peoples have to prove the existence of these rights on a case-
by-case basis in order to gain judicial protection. 
While this paradigm represents a clear advance over the paradigm of 
non-recognition that tended to dominate Canadian jurisprudence in 
earlier days, it has several drawbacks. These relate to three areas: (1) 
Crown sovereignty; (2) proof of Aboriginal rights; and (3) the potential 
for evolution. I will say a few words about each. 
1.  Crown Sovereignty 
Prior to Haida Nation, the Supreme Court generally took the view 
that the existence of Crown sovereignty over indigenous peoples was 
legally unassailable. As the Court stated in the Sparrow case: 
 It is worth recalling that while British policy towards the native 
population was based on respect for their right to occupy their 
traditional lands, a proposition to which the Royal Proclamation of 
1763 bears witness, there was from the outset never any doubt that 
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sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title, to 
such lands vested in the Crown; ...
5
 
Yet many indigenous people take the view that the Crown’s acquisition 
of control over their territories was an illegitimate act, consummated 
without their consent. This illegitimacy was compounded by the ensuing 
acts of dispossession, segregation and disenfranchisement visited on 
many Aboriginal groups by the Crown. Some deny outright that the 
Crown ever gained lawful sovereignty over them, arguing that they were 
never conquered by the Crown and never voluntarily ceded their territo-
ries to the Crown or accepted its claims of authority. Others point to 
ancient treaties as the basis of their relationship with the Crown, as 
friends and allies rather than subjects. Still others say that the Crown 
stands as the protector of their rights rather than as a “sovereign” on the 
European model. In one way or another, then, Crown sovereignty has 
always been a sticking point for Aboriginal peoples — even when pre-
sented as part and parcel of the common law doctrine of Aboriginal 
rights. 
2.  Proof of Aboriginal Rights 
Under the dominant paradigm, if the Crown disputes the existence 
of Aboriginal rights claimed by an indigenous group, the group bears 
the burden of proving the existence of these rights in court. This process 
is usually extremely time-consuming and costly and in the end may fail 
to yield an effective remedy. It also means that, absent a definitive court 
ruling, Aboriginal peoples are not in a strong position to protect their 
rights from invasion or impairment, so that the existence of Aboriginal 
rights is often more theoretical than real. To many indigenous peoples, it 
seems paradoxical that they should be put to the task of proving their 
rights in the courts, when they are the original inhabitants of this land. 
3.  The Potential for Evolution 
The standard paradigm holds that, once Aboriginal rights are proven 
to have existed at the critical historical date (often centuries ago), they 
continue to exist more or less in their original form, with only a modest 
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allowance for evolution and change. This approach does not allow 
courts to take proper account of the tremendous changes that have oc-
curred in Canadian society in the interval. It mandates the recognition of 
Aboriginal rights in historical configurations that are often ill-adapted to 
contemporary conditions. At the same time, it does not permit courts to 
consider the interests of third parties and the larger society in moulding 
the modern contours of Aboriginal rights. 
So courts are forced to make hard and somewhat unrealistic choices. 
Either they must hold that the asserted Aboriginal rights continue to 
exist in their original historical forms, which may satisfy neither the 
Aboriginal claimants nor third-party stakeholders. Or they must hold 
that the rights have been extinguished, which often compounds the in-
justices already experienced by the indigenous parties and fails to re-
solve the long-standing grievances that separate them from their 
neighbours. In other words, the paradigm does not lend itself to a flexi-
ble approach which permits Aboriginal rights to be recognized in a form 
that makes allowance for the current and future needs of Aboriginal 
peoples and the reasonable interests of the larger society. 
III. THE NEW PARADIGM 
In the Haida Nation and Taku River decisions, we witness the 
emergence of a new constitutional paradigm governing Aboriginal 
rights. This paradigm recognizes the potential of section 35 as a genera-
tive constitutional order — one that mandates the Crown to negotiate 
with Aboriginal peoples for the recognition of their rights in a contem-
porary form that balances their needs with the interests of the broader 
society. 
According to this approach, when the Crown claimed sovereignty 
over Canadian territories and ultimately gained factual control over 
them, it did so in the face of pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty and 
territorial rights. The tension between these conflicting claims gave rise 
to a special relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples, 
which requires the Crown to deal honourably with Aboriginal peoples. 
The “honour of the Crown” obliges the Crown to respect Aboriginal 
rights, which in turn requires it to negotiate with Aboriginal peoples 
with a view to identifying those rights. It also obliges the Crown to 
consult with Aboriginal peoples in all cases where its activities affect 
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their asserted rights and, where appropriate, to accommodate these 
rights by adjusting the activities.
6
 
The Court’s overall approach is outlined by McLachlin C.J. in a 
pithy paragraph:  
 Put simply, Canada's Aboriginal peoples were here when 
Europeans came, and were never conquered. Many bands reconciled 
their claims with the sovereignty of the Crown through negotiated 
treaties. Others, notably in British Columbia, have yet to do so. The 
potential rights embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. The honour of the Crown requires that these 
rights be determined, recognized and respected. This, in turn, requires 
the Crown, acting honourably, to participate in processes of 
negotiation. While this process continues, the honour of the Crown 




This new approach attempts to remedy some of the main drawbacks 
of the standard paradigm. Let us review the three areas of difficulty 
identified earlier. 
1.  Crown Sovereignty 
In Haida Nation and Taku River, the Supreme Court is careful to 
avoid suggesting that the Crown gained sovereignty over Aboriginal 
peoples in a lawful or legitimate manner. The Court speaks of the 
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, as opposed to its acquisition of sov-
ereignty, and it notes that this assertion effectively collided with the pre-
existing sovereignty and territorial rights of indigenous peoples. The 
Court acknowledges that the Crown ultimately gained factual control of 
the territories claimed — what it describes as de facto sovereignty. But 
it pointedly refrains from concluding that this sovereignty is de jure. 
The term de facto characterizes a state of affairs that is illegal or ille-
gitimate but accepted for practical purposes. It contrasts with the term 
de jure, which means rightful, legitimate, just, or constitutional, and 
generally describes a condition in which there has been full compliance 
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with all legal requirements.
8
 Overall, the Court’s choice of language 
suggests that the Crown’s claims of sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples 
will continue to be legally deficient until there has been a just settlement 
of their rights through negotiated treaties. As McLachlin C.J. says: 
Treaties serve to reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal sovereignty with 
assumed Crown sovereignty, and to define Aboriginal rights 
guaranteed by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Section 35 
represents a promise of rights recognition, and “[i]t is always assumed 
that the Crown intends to fulfil its promises” ... . This promise is 




2.  Proof of Aboriginal Rights 
The judgment in Haida Nation opens by observing that the Queen 
Charlotte Islands are the “traditional homelands” of the Haida people 
and that from time immemorial the cedar forests of the Islands have 
played a central role in the culture and economy of the Haida people.
10
 
In a sense, the rest of the judgment represents a sustained deliberation 
on the significance of this observation. For it is the fundamental fact that 
indigenous peoples were the original inhabitants of Canada that puts 
Aboriginal claims on a different footing than the normal range of claims 
that come before the courts. 
The Court holds that, where the Crown disputes the existence or 
scope of Aboriginal rights claimed by an indigenous group, the group 
does not have to prove the existence of the rights in court in order to 
protect them from invasion or impairment. The Crown has the duty to 
consult with indigenous peoples regarding their asserted rights, and in 
certain cases to accommodate them, even in the absence of definitive 
proof that the rights exist. 
But when does the duty to consult arise, if not on proof of the as-
serted Aboriginal right? Is the mere assertion of the right enough to 
trigger the duty? Chief Justice McLachlin replies that the duty arises 
when two conditions are fulfilled: (1) the Crown has knowledge, real or 
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constructive, of the potential existence of the Aboriginal right; and (2) it 
contemplates conduct that might adversely affect the right.
11
 
Of course this pushes the question back a stage. For, as the Chief 
Justice acknowledges, it can fairly be asked how the Crown can be said 
to have knowledge of an Aboriginal right when the existence of the right 
has not been demonstrated. This question evidently taxed the Chief 
Justice somewhat, because she refers back to her dissenting opinion in 
the Marshall case, where she maintained that one cannot “meaningfully 
discuss accommodation or justification of a right unless one has some 
idea of the core of that right and its modern scope.”
12
 While giving that 
argument its due, the Chief Justice points out that it is often possible to 
gain a sufficient idea of the asserted right and its strength to trigger an 
obligation to consult and accommodate, even in the absence of a final 
judicial determination. To facilitate this process, she urges Aboriginal 
claimants to outline their claims with clarity, focusing on the scope and 
nature of the asserted right and infringement.
13
 She goes on to explain 
that the duty to consult and accommodate operates on a sliding scale, 
varying in scope and intensity depending on a preliminary assessment of 
the strength of the case supporting the existence of the right and the 
seriousness of the potential adverse effects on the right.
14
 
How satisfactory is the answer that the Chief Justice gives to the ob-
jection she voiced in Marshall? I suggest that her approach makes sense 
in light of the view that the specific Aboriginal rights asserted by par-
ticular indigenous groups are instantiations of a panoply of presumptive 
generic rights arising from the great encounter between Aboriginal 
peoples and the Crown.
15
 In other words, Aboriginal rights do not pro-
ceed ex nihilo, like rabbits out of hats, in which case we might rightly 
say that we believe it only when we see it. The honour of the Crown 
supports a range of generic rights presumptively held by all Aboriginal 
peoples. The specifics of these rights vary from group to group. But it 
can safely be assumed that all Aboriginal groups hold these rights in one 
form or another. For example, all Aboriginal peoples have a generic 
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 Haida Nation, supra, note 3, at para. 36. 
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15 
 For more on the distinction between generic and specific rights, see Slattery, “Making 
Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 196, at 211-18. 
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right to the exclusive use and occupation of an ancestral territory. Where 
that territory is located and how much remains under Aboriginal title are 
matters to be settled in each case. But it is the presumptive generic right 
to an ancestral territory that gives the concrete land claim of an Aborigi-
nal group its distinctive legal heft and credibility. 
3.  The Potential for Evolution 
The Court emphasizes that the Crown has the duty to achieve a just 
settlement of Aboriginal claims by negotiation and treaty. So doing, the 
Court attributes a generative role to section 35. In effect, it holds that 
the Crown, with the assistance of the courts, has the duty to bring into 
being a new legal order that accommodates Aboriginal rights, through 
negotiation and agreement with the indigenous peoples affected. This 
approach views section 35 as serving a dynamic and not simply static 
function — a function that does not come to an end even when treaties 
are successfully negotiated. As the Supreme Court states: 
 The jurisprudence of this Court supports the view that the duty to 
consult and accommodate is part of a process of fair dealing and 
reconciliation that begins with the assertion of sovereignty and 
continues beyond formal claims resolution. Reconciliation is not a 
final legal remedy in the usual sense. Rather, it is a process flowing 
from rights guaranteed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
16
 
In other words, section 35 does not simply recognize a static body 
of specific Aboriginal rights, whose contours may be ascertained by the 
application of general legal criteria to historical circumstances — his-
torical rights for short. Rather, the section binds the Crown to take posi-
tive steps to identify Aboriginal rights in a contemporary form, with the 
consent of the indigenous parties concerned — what we may call set-
tlement rights. Settlement rights have two distinctive characteristics, not 
shared by historical rights. First, they represent contemporary restate-
ments of Aboriginal rights in a form that renders them useful and com-
modious for indigenous groups in modern conditions. Second, 
settlement rights perforce take account of the interests of the broader 
society, of which Aboriginal peoples are also members. 
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The Supreme Court evidently feels that the judicial branch should 
concern itself primarily with the task of recognizing and protecting 
historical rights and leave the task of identifying modern versions of 
these rights to the executive branch, through the processes of negotia-
tion and agreement with indigenous peoples. But it must be remembered 
that, without the courts’ ability to shield historical rights from govern-
mental intrusion, the chances of reaching agreement on settlement rights 
would often be very slight indeed. 
What then is the precise relationship between historical rights and 
settlement rights? To put the question another way, what is the link 
between: (1) Aboriginal rights identified by applying general legal crite-
ria to particular historical circumstances (typically through litigation); 
and (2) Aboriginal rights identified by balancing the contemporary 
rights and interests of Aboriginal nations and those of the broader com-
munity (typically through negotiation)? The Court intimates that litiga-
tion and negotiation are both modes of reconciliation, while suggesting 
that negotiation is the preferable way of reconciling state and Aboriginal 
interests.
17
 But it does not attempt to explain the fact that two processes 
are likely to yield quite different results in practice. 
There are three ways of explaining the relationship between histori-
cal rights and settlement rights. The first argues that the two are actually 
quite different sorts of rights, with distinct origins and content. Histori-
cal rights alone merit the appellation of Aboriginal rights, since they 
alone are identified by reference to the ancestral customs and practices 
of indigenous peoples. Settlement rights are not true Aboriginal rights. 
In reality, they are simply consensual or contractual rights, grounded in 
agreement between the parties. So, according to this view, when treaties 
are negotiated, they typically replace the Aboriginal rights of the in-
digenous parties with settlement rights flowing from the agreement. We 
may call this the contractual theory, because it posits a clean break 
between historical rights and settlement rights.  
This theory has some merits. It rightly points to the substantial dif-
ferences that sometimes exist between historical rights and the rights 
recognized in modern agreements. And it rightly emphasizes the con-
sensual — and in that sense contractual — nature of such agreements. 
However, it also has several difficulties. It does not correspond to the 
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perspective of most indigenous peoples, who view treaties as modes of 
articulating and protecting their basic rights rather than as simply crea-
tive enterprises, much less as vehicles of extinguishment. The theory 
also ignores the fact that many treaties can hardly be understood without 
reference to the historical Aboriginal rights that form their backdrop.  
The second theory argues, to the contrary, that settlement rights are 
modern incarnations of the historical rights held by Aboriginal peoples. 
They represent an attempt to give Aboriginal rights a contemporary 
form, one that adapts them to the current needs of Aboriginal peoples 
and the larger society. So settlement rights are in a sense the modern 
descendants of historical rights and bear a family resemblance to them. 
We may call this the evolutionary theory, because it holds that historical 
rights are the original prototypes and progenitors of settlement rights.  
While closer to the truth than the first view, this position also has its 
difficulties. In emphasizing the link between historical and settlement 
rights, it downplays the often striking concrete differences between 
them. How can rights that are so different in the flesh actually be said to 
bear a family resemblance? 
The third view represents an attempt to deal with this difficulty. It 
calls in aid the distinction between generic Aboriginal rights and spe-
cific Aboriginal rights (mentioned earlier) and argues that generic rights 
may take different concrete forms at different epochs. Historical rights 
represent the specific forms that generic rights assumed at certain criti-
cal dates in the past, be it the time of European contact, the date of as-
serted Crown sovereignty, or the period of effective Crown control.
18
 
But historical rights are not the only possible incarnations of generic 
Aboriginal rights, which are grounded in the honour of the Crown and 
remain, as it were, evergreen. Settlement rights represent the specific 
form that generic Aboriginal rights take at the time a particular treaty is 
concluded, as identified through a process of negotiation and agree-
ment.
19
 But even treaties and agreements do not exhaust the creative 
potential of generic rights, which remain a potent source of future gen-
erations of rights. We may call this the generative theory, because it 
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 The Supreme Court has identified a variety of critical dates for different categories of 
historical rights; see R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507; Delgamuukw v. 
British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 and R. v. Powley, [2003] S.C.J. No. 
43, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207. 
19 
 Of course, not all rights found in treaties are “settlement rights” in the sense used here; 
some are simply the product of agreement. 
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views Aboriginal rights as operating on two levels — the first, abstract 
and timeless; the second, concrete and time-bound — with the first level 
continuously regenerating and refreshing the second. This theory is the 
most appealing of the three, because of its capacity to explain both the 
underlying continuity of Aboriginal rights and their protean ability to 
assume different concrete forms. 
IV. THE SOURCE OF THE DUTY TO ACT HONOURABLY 
As we have seen, the Supreme Court holds that the Crown has a 
general duty to act honourably as regards indigenous peoples and their 
rights. The Court refers to this as “the Crown’s duty of honourable deal-
ing” or more briefly “the honour of the Crown.”
20
  
But how did the Crown’s duty to act honourably arise? Here again 
there are three theories. The first argues that the Crown voluntarily 
assumed this duty when it asserted sovereignty over the indigenous 
peoples of Canada. In effect, the duty arose from a freely undertaken 
Crown Act. A plausible candidate is the Royal Proclamation of 1763, 
where the Crown states:  
... whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to Our Interest and 
the Security of Our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of 
Indians, with whom We are connected, and who live under Our 
Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of 
such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded 
to, or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their 
Hunting Grounds; ... 
21
 
Advocates of this theory point to the Proclamation’s declaration that 
Indian nations live under the Crown’s protection and argue that the 
document’s detailed provisions are only partial articulations of the basic 
responsibilities that the Crown assumed. 
The second theory does not necessarily deny the far-reaching effects 
of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, but it argues that the document only 
gave voice to what was in reality a pre-existing legal duty or responsi-
bility. This duty flowed from a general principle of imperial law that 
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governed the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over indigenous peoples 
and required the Crown to deal honourably with these peoples and re-
spect their basic rights. So the Proclamation was, in this respect, not a 
pure “act of grace” on the part of the Crown, but rather an explicit rec-
ognition of what was in fact its bounden legal duty. 
The third theory takes an altogether different tack. It suggests that 
the duty to act honourably stems from the explicit recognition and af-
firmation of Aboriginal rights in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982. As such the duty only came into existence at the time the section 
was enacted in 1982 and presumably only governs Crown dealings from 
that date onwards. Prior to this time, while specific fiduciary obligations 
bound the Crown in particular contexts, the general duty to act honoura-
bly did not exist beyond the purely moral and political sphere. 
Which of these theories does the Supreme Court favour in Haida 
Nation? At least one thing is clear: the Court rejects the third theory. 
Time and again it insists that the duty to act honourably governs all the 
Crown’s dealings with Aboriginal peoples “from the assertion of sover-
eignty to the resolution of claims and the implementation of treaties.”
22
 
The Court’s clearest statement on the point comes in its response to 
the argument advanced by the Province of British Columbia that the 
Crown’s duty to consult or accommodate rests solely with the federal 
government. The province invoked section 109 of the Constitution Act, 
1867,
23
 which provides that “[a]ll Lands, Mines, Minerals, and Royalties 
belonging to the several Provinces of Canada . . . at the Union . . . shall 
belong to the several Provinces.” The province argued that this provi-
sion gave it exclusive rights to the lands at issue. This right, it main-
tained, could not be limited by the protection for Aboriginal rights found 
in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, for to do so would under-
mine the balance of federalism.
24
 
The Supreme Court rejects this argument. It points out that, under 
the terms of section 109, the provinces took their interest in lands sub-
ject to “any Interest other than that of the Province in the same.” It goes 
on to hold that the duty to consult and accommodate “is grounded in the 
assertion of Crown sovereignty which pre-dated the Union.” It follows 
that the province took the lands subject to this duty. It cannot therefore 
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 Haida Nation, supra, note 3, at para. 17; see also paras. 32, 53 and 59. 
23
  Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 
5. 
24
  Haida Nation, supra, note 3, at paras. 57-58. 
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argue that section 35 deprives it of powers it would otherwise have 
enjoyed.
25
 So, the Court clearly rules out the view that the duty to act 
honourably only came into existence in 1982, with the enactment of 
section 35. 
Elsewhere, the Court makes statements favouring the view that the 
honour of the Crown flows from general principles of law applying at 
the time of asserted sovereignty. In a passage noted earlier, Chief Justice 
McLachlin C.J. says that the duty to consult and accommodate is part of 
a process of fair dealing and reconciliation that begins with the assertion 
of sovereignty and continues beyond formal claims resolution. She goes 
on to state:  
This process of reconciliation flows from the Crown’s duty of 
honourable dealing toward Aboriginal peoples, which arises in turn 
from the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over an Aboriginal people 
and de facto control of land and resources that were formerly in the 
control of that people. As stated in Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 
911, 2001 SCC 33, at para. 9, “[w]ith this assertion [sovereignty] 
arose an obligation to treat Aboriginal peoples fairly and honourably, 
and to protect them from exploitation.”
26
 
This passage suggests that the duty of honourable dealing arose 
automatically upon the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over indige-
nous nations. The Court does not invoke any specific Crown acts, such 
as the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Rather it portrays the duty as the 
inevitable by-product of the process itself. No doubt the Court would 
acknowledge that the Proclamation bears witness to the existence of the 
duty, but evidently it rejects the view that the Proclamation (or any other 
Crown Act) is its source. 
What role, then, does section 35 play in implementing the honour of 
the Crown? According to Haida Nation, the section has a dual function. 
On the one hand, it serves as a basis for the judicial identification and 
protection of historical Aboriginal rights, through the application of 
general constitutional principles. On the other hand, it serves as a 
springboard for negotiations leading to just settlements, in which Abo-
riginal rights are recognized in a modern form and reconciled with the 
interests of the larger society. In both cases, the process is informed by 
the honour of the Crown. 
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